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158 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 
ceteris paribus, executives are penalized at the margin, 
with reduced compensation, for achieving higher reve-
nue growth. Third, these results suggest that managers 
are, at least partially, motivated by nonpecuniary mo-
tives (power and prestige) to maximize revenue. The 
Board, fearing this propensity to increase revenue growth 
beyond the profit maximizing rate, "penalizes" this 
revenue maximizing behavior with lower compensation. 
Rather than refuting the Baumol revenue maximization 
hypothesis, this study implicitly supports Baumol's 
central insight that managers may, indeed, have non-
pecuniary incentives to increase revenue. 
Furthermore, this study supports the view that Boards 
provide accounting profit maximization incentives to 
the CEO, which suggests that managers, as viewed by 
the Board, need this incentive to align their interests 
with those of the Board. We find that stock returns are 
not related to our measure of compensation. This find-
ing indicates that either (1) Boards are not themselves 
value maximizers, and therefore, find no interest in 
aligning the CEO with this goal, or (2) Boards are value 
maximizers, but provide the CEO with other incentives 
for value maximization not included in our compensa-
tion measure such as stock options and stock owner-
ship. 
Finally, the results suggest that Boards of Directors 
have goals, as revealed by their compensation policies 
for the CEO, which are consistent with accounting 
profit maximization, and that are not consistent with 
revenue maximization. In the context of agency theory, 
these findings support the view that owners, operating 
through their Boards, have a degree of control over 
these firms' managers for these time periods. 
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ESTIMATING THE DEGREE OF MARKET POWER IN THE 
BEEF PACKING INDUSTRY 
John R. Schroeter* 
Abstract-A technique for assessing the degree of monopoly 
power, developed by Appelbaum (1979, 1982), is extended here 
to permit measurement of monopsony power as well. Data 
from the U.S. beef packing industry are examined. The results 
reveal small, but statistically significant monopoly/monopsony 
price distortions in slaughter cattle and wholesale beef markets 
but, in spite of a recent trend toward heightened concentration 
in the industry, give no indication that performance has be-
come appreciably less competitive of late. 
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The structure of the beef packing industry in the 
United States has become increasingly concentrated 
within the past decade, and so it is not surprising that 
the possibility of non-competitive performance in 
slaughter cattle and wholesale beef markets is a matter 
of growing concern.1 In recent papers (1979, 1982), Ap-
1 Connor et al. (1985, p. 75) report that the four firm con-
centration ratio in beef slaughtering had reached 45% by early 
1982, roughly double the 1977 value. The primary concern 
seems to be the possibility of abusive exercises of monopsony 
power (Multop and Helmuth, 1980; Ward, 1982; Quail et al., 
1985; and Azzam et al., 1986), but the issue of monopoly 
power has also been addressed (Ball and Chambers, 1982; 
Parker and Connor, 1980). 
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pelbaum presents a technique for estimating the degree 
of monopolistic performance in a market. In the next 
section, the theoretical framework of that technique is 
summarized and adapted to the assessment of monopo-
listic and monopsonistic performance. An application of 
the adapted technique to data from the U.S. beef pack-
ing industry enables tests of the competitiveness of the 
industry's input and output markets. Briefly, the results 
confirm the presence of small price distortions due to 
monopoly/ monopsony power but reveal no apparent 
tendency, in recent years, toward less competitive per-
formance. 
The Model 
Let the industry be comprised of N firms (indexed 
j = 1, 2, ... , N) producing a homogeneous output. In 
view of the intended application, assume that the pro-
duction technology is characterized by fixed proportions 
of output (dressed beef carcasses) and a single material 
input (live cattle). 2 With appropriately chosen dimen-
sions, the quantities of the material input and output 
can then be represented by the same variable for both 
the /h firm (Qi) and the industry (Q = L:~~ 1Q1 ). Ad-
ditional inputs are employed in variable proportions in 
the conversion of the material input to output. Denote 
the ph firm's quantity of the i 1h non-material input by 
xf. For a fixed level of output, each firm will minimize 
the costs of non-material inputs. Assuming that these 
inputs are purchased in competitive factor markets, 
Shephard's Lemma applies and the non-material factor 
demands for the /h firm are 
x( = acJ(Q1, w);aw, for all i (1) 
where Ci(., .) is the ph firm's non-material input cost 
function, w, is the price of the i 1h non-material input, 
and w is a vector of the w,' s. 
Firms are not necessarily price takers in the material 
input and output markets, however. In general, each 
expects that a change in its own output will affect 
market quantity and price to some degree. Let market 
price and quantities be related via industry demand and 
supply functions 
Q=H(p,Z1 ) 
Q = F( WM, Z2) 
(2) 
(3) 
where p is the price of output, wM is the price of the 
material input, and Z1 and Z2 are vectors of exogenous 
2 This assumption seems entirely appropriate since U.S. an-
nual average dressing yields for cattle (carcass weight per 100 
lbs. of live animal) have varied by less than 8% in a gradual 
upward trend over the past 30 years. Even this modest varia-
tion is due mainly to changes in the composition of the 
slaughter rather than variation in dressing yields for specific 
grades and size classes. 
variables. The problem for the jth firm is to choose Q1 
to maximize 
pQ1 - wMQ1 - C1( Qi, w) 
subject to (2) and (3). The first order necessary condi-
tion is 
p(1 + 81 /11) = wM(1 + 81 /€) + aC1 jaQ1 (4) 
where 11 = (a HI a p) pI Q' the elasticity of market de-
mand; 
€ = (aF;awM)wM/Q, the elasticity of material 
input supply; and 
(}1 = ( aQ;aQi)Qi jQ, the ph firm's conjectural 
elasticity. 
That is, 81 is the Ph firm's perceived rate of change of 
market output (material input) with respect to own 
output (material input), expressed as an elasticity. Price 
taking firms expect that changes in their own output 
levels will leave price and, hence, market quantity un-
changed; consequently, 81 = 0 in this case. In a pure 
monopoly, Q = Q1 and so (}1 = 1. In general, firms 
that wield market power anticipate a fall in price (in-
crease in market quantity) in response to an increase in 
own output. For such firms, (}J > 0. A test of (}1 = 0 
can thus be interpreted as a test of competitive behav-
ior. 
Two useful indices of market power can be derived 
from equation ( 4), which asserts equality between the 
firm's perceived marginal revenue and perceived margi-
nal cost. As is well known, Lerner's index, the difference 
between price and marginal cost as a proportion of 
price, measures the relative monopoly price distortion. 
Denoting the jth firm's Lerner's index by Li, equation 
(4) can be manipulated to yield 
u = -81/11· (5) 
When equation ( 4) is rearranged as 
wM(1 + 81j€) = p(1 + 81/11)- acJjaQ1, (6) 
it expresses equality between the marginal factor cost of 
the material input and its marginal net revenue product 
(MNRP), the marginal revenue product net of the 
marginal cost of non-material inputs. Since MNRP and 
the factor price would be equal if the market were 
competitive, the difference between MNRP and wM as 
a proportion of the latter is an index of the relative 
monopsony price distortion. Denoting this index for the 
ph firm by Mi, equation (6) can be rearranged to yield 
M 1 = 81 /€. (7) 
Note that both of the proposed indices measure mo-
nopoly /monopsony power directly in terms of price 
distortions, rather than indirectly, in terms of profit 
rates or concentration. 
The usual difficulties of obtaining firm-specific data 
require that any econometric implementation of the 
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160 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 
model be carried out using industry data. Thus, certain 
aggregation conditions must be maintained in order 
that equations (1) and (4) have meaningful, industry-
wide counterparts. Assume that the firms' non-material 
input cost functions are given by 
Cl(Qi,w) = QlC(w) 
+ Gi(w)forj=1,2, ... ,N. (8) 
Marginal processing costs are thus taken to be constant 
at a value common to all firms. 3 As Appelbaum (1982) 
points out, this is the usual assumption required for 
aggregation across firms. Using equations (1), the in-
dustry demands for non-material inputs are 
N 
xi= L x( = QBC(w)jawi 
j=l 
N 
+ L aGJ( w )jaw, for all i. (9) 
j=l 
Since BC1 jBQi = C(w) for all firms, equation (4) im-
plies that, in equilibrium, all firms will operate with the 
same value of 81.4 Denoting this common value by 8, 
equation (4) can be rewritten in terms of industry 
variables and parameters alone as 
p(1 + 8!11) = wM(1 + 8j£) + C(w). (10) 
Estimation and Empirical Results 
To estimate the model, functional forms must be 
chosen for equations (2), (3) and (8), the components of 
the vectors Z1 and Z2 must be identified, and a para-
meterization for the conjectural elasticity, 8, must be 
introduced. Take the industry non-material input cost 
function to be of the generalized Leontief form. 5 
Specifically, let 
N 
C(Q,w) = L C1(Q1,w) =Ql;L;bik(wiwk)112 
j=l i k 
3 Since firms possess monopsony power in the market for the 
single material input, the marginal factor cost of this input 
does vary across firms as firms' conjectural elasticities vary. 
4 This does not mean that all firms have the same conjectural 
elasticity functions; merely that, in equilibrium, all will choose 
output levels at which () values are the same. The model would 
have implications about market structure if assumptions about 
the specific nature of firms' conjectures were added. For exam-
ple, with Coumot conjectures, ()J = Q' /Q and equilibrium 
implies equal market shares. 
5 See Diewert (1974) for a discussion of the generalized 
Leontief cost function and its properties. The sample period 
witnessed the advent of "boxed beef' as an important alterna-
tive to the less highly processed carcass beef product. Since 
degrees of freedom were quite scarce, no allowance was made 
in estimation for changes in the structure of the cost function 
due to such technological changes. 
where 
bik = bk, for all i and k, 
1/2' C(w)=l;L;bik(wiwk) , 
i k 
and 
N 
L Gl(w) = L;b,wi. 
j=l 
With the non-material inputs taken to be labor (i = L) 
and capital (i = K), for example, equations (9) and (10) 
become 
XK = ( bKK + bLK( wLfwK )112) Q + bK (11) 
XL = ( bLL + bLK ( WKjwL) 112) Q + bL (12) 
p(1 + 8!11) 
= wM(1 + 8j£) 
+(bLLWL + 2bLK(WLWK)1/2 + bKKwK)· 
(13) 
For the demand and supply relations, equations (2) 
and (3), assume the following functional forms 
(demand) In Q =a+ 71ln(pjS1) + y1ln(Ph/S1 ) 
+ y2 ln(pc/S1 ) + y3 ln(Y/S1 ) 
+ y4 ln(POP) (14) 
(suppry )In Q = b + dn( wMjS2) + 81ln(p1/S2 ) 
+82 ln( c,) (15) 
where 
S1 = consumer price index 
ph = wholesale price of pork 
Pc = wholesale price of chicken 
Y =per capita nominal income 
POP = population 
s2 = farm output price index 
Pt = price of feed com, and 
Cs = stock of cattle on farms.6 
Provision of a formal model of firms' conjectures is 
beyond the scope of this paper so, as in Appelbaum 
(1982), 8 is simply modeled as a general function of 
exogenous variables to allow equilibrium conjectures to 
vary with market conditions. Hence, define 
81 = 81 + 82wL + 83wK + 84 t (16) 
where t is a time trend variable included as a proxy for 
omitted economic variables, and 81 , 82 , 83 , and 84 are 
unknown parameters.7 Conjectural elasticity, and its 
6 Details of variable definitions are contained in an appendix 
available from the author upon request. 
•
7 Concentration is likely to influence equilibrium conjectures. 
Annual data on concentration in beef packing are unavailable, 
however. 
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TABLE I.-RESULTS OF FuLL INFORMATION MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION, ANNUAL DATA, SAMPLE = 1951-83 
Asymptotic Asymptotic 
Standard Standard 
Estimate Error Estimate Error 
bLL 0.00278 (0.00034) ( 1.6886 (0.1453) 
bLK 0.00020 (0.00013) Bl -0.0485 (0.1575) 
bKK 0.2026 (0.1911) 82 2.5313 (0.2720) 
bL 101.45 (133.35) (Jl 0.0369 (0.0062) 
a 13.769 (0.183) (}2 -0.0019 (0.0005) 
" 
-0.5273 (0.0642) (}3 0.0073 (0.0028) 
Y1 0.1789 (0.0528) (}4 -0.0014 (0.0010) 
Y2 -0.0690 (0.0428) pr 1.0129 (0.0166) 
YJ 1.3409 (0.2141) P2 0.2126 (0.1443) 
Y4 -0.6996 (0.0884) P3 0.7026 (0.1951) 
b -26.763 (3.746) P4 0.1416 (0.1467) 
Conventional R2 valuesb 
for equation: 
(12) 0.867 
(13) 0.992 
(14) 0.988 
(15) 0.746 
Log of likelihood function -225.80 
"p1 , P2• P3• and p4 are first order autoregressive parameters for the disturbances of equations (12), (13), (14), and (15), respectively. The point estimate of p1 
is e_eater than one. The marginal significance level for a test of p1 > 1 is well above CQnventionallevels, however. 
The conventional R 2 values are the proportions of the variation in an endogenous variable (p for the profit maximization condition, In Q for demand and 
supply, and x L for labor demand) which are explained by each equation's series of one step ahead forecasts based on FIML estimates of the model's 
parameters. 
TABLE 2.-ESTIMATES OF CONJECTURAL ELASTICITIES AND MONOPOLY I MONOPSONY PRICE DISTORTIONS 
FOR SELECTED YEARS 
Conjectural Monopoly Price Monopsony Price 
Year Elasticity, (} Distortion, L = - fJ I'll Distortion M = fJI€ 
1951 .0417 (.0061) .0791 (.0125) .0247 (.0044) 
1955 .0360 (.0063) .0683 (.0132) .0213 (.0042) 
1960 .0286 (.0074) .0542 (.0155) .0169 (.0046) 
1965 .0222 (.0079) .0420 (.0163) .0131 (.0047) 
1970 .0149 (.0103) .0282 (.0206) .0088 (.0061) 
1975 .0176 (.0083) .0333 (.0168) .0104 (.0049) 
1977 .0217 (.0063) .0412 (.0131) .0129 (.0038) 
1979 .0179 (.0093) .0339 (.0188) .0106 (.0055) 
1980 .0178 (.0102) .0337 (.0205) .0105 (.0060) 
1981 .0141 (.0126) .0268 (.0250) .0084 (.0075) 
1982 .0182 (.0095) 
1983 .0190 (.0074) 
Note: Parentheses contain asymptotic standard errors. 
implications about market power, are the main focus of 
this research but when (16) is substituted into equation 
(13), the 8; 's are identified only if information on 'IJ and 
t: is available. In addition, the impact of the choice of a 
specific form for the cost function will be reduced if 
(13) is estimated subject to the theoretical restrictions 
on cost parameters embodied in equations (11) and 
(12). These considerations suggest joint estimation of 
equations (11) through (15). Unfortunately, construc-
tion of a reliable capital input series was not possible, 
so equation (11) could not be used. 
The system of equations (12) through (15), with 81 as 
given in (16), was estimated in quasi-first difference 
.0345 (.0191) .0108 (.0056) 
.0360 (.0151) .0112 (.0044) 
form by full information maximum likelihood (FIML) 
using annual data from the U.S. beef packing industry 
for the years 1951 through 1983.8 The results are re-
ported in table 1. 
The generalized Leontief cost function is linearly 
homogeneous by construction. Concavity is guaranteed 
8 Specifically, the equations were augmented with additive 
error terms assun1ed to follow first-order autoregressive pat-
terns, and then transformed to versions with nonautocorrelated 
disturbances by quasi-first differencing. The AR(1) parameters 
and the structural parameters of the model were estimated 
jointly. Amemiya (1977) establishes the asymptotic distribution 
for the FIML estimator. 
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162 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 
by a positive sign for bLx· Positive values for bLL, hxx• 
and bL, as well as bLK• guarantee that the cost function 
is positive and increasing in each factor price for all 
points in input price space. Thus, the estimated cost 
function is well behaved. 
Estimates of y1 and y3 suggest that beef is a normal 
good for which pork is a substitute. The significantly 
negative estimate of y4 is anomalous, however. The 
population variable may be serving as a proxy for a 
time trend and capturing the effect of recent changes in 
tastes that have shifted consumption patterns from red 
meat to alternative sources of protein. The estimate of 
82 confirms theory suggesting that the supply of 
slaughter cattle is positively related to the stock of cattle 
on farms.9 
The estimates of the parameters of equation (16) and 
their implications about conjectural elasticities and 
market power are of primary interest. Table 2 displays 
estimates and standard errors for conjectural elasticities 
and the indices of monopoly (equation (5)) and monop-
sony (equation (7)) power for several of the years in the 
sample. The estimates of 8 are significantly greater than 
zero at the 1% level in 20, and at the 5% level in 28 of 
the 33 years. Thus, there is clear evidence that the 
assumption. of price-taking behavior is inappropriate 
for the beef packing industry.10 The attendant mo-
nopoly /monopsony price distortions tend to be rela-
tively modest, however, as the estimated magnitudes of 
L and M indicate. In the later years of the sample, the 
output and input market relative price distortions are 
about 3% and 1%, respectively. Moreover, the recent 
decline in structural competitiveness (that is, the post-
1977 increase in industry concentration) has not in-
creased the size of these distortions: The values of L 
and M have been relatively stable since 1970.U 
9 Surprisingly, chicken is not revealed to be an important 
substitute for beef; the estimate of y2 is negative thougll 
insignificant. The fact that the estimate of 81 is insignificant is 
not surprising, however, in view of the ambiguity of the 
relationship between cattle supply and feed price. A higli price 
of feed, if anticipated, could have produced past curtailments 
of breeding activity and be associated with low current supply. 
If unanticipated, it could lead to liqnidation of current stocks 
and higli current supply. 
10 The magnitudes of conjectural elasticities estimated in this 
study are rougllly comparable to those Appelbaum (1982) 
found for the rubber and textile industries. Those estimates 
generally were not statistically significant, however, and led to 
the conclusion that the industries are characterized by competi-
tive behavior. 
11 The work of Bradburd and Over (1982) suggests one 
possible means of reconciling increasing concentration with no 
deterioration in performance. Their evidence indicates that the 
"integrative" concentration level, the level at which cooper-
ative behavior becomes rational, can be quite higli ( CR4 "" 
68%). 
Summary 
Recent increases in concentration in the U.S. beef 
packing industry have raised the suspicion of non-com-
petitive performance. This paper investigates that possi-
bility by adapting and applying a technique for estimat-
ing performance based indices of input and output 
market power. The technique produces estimates of 
monopoly /monopsony price distortions that generally 
are statistically significant but of quite small magnitude. 
Moreover, they suggest that there has been no appreci-
able worsening of the markets' performance during the 
recent period of increasing concentration. 
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